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THE ROLE OF THE DD/I IN WARTIME

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Over the past two years the offices under the direction of the DD/I have been formulating plans for wartime operation. The present functions of these offices include the production of national intelligence, both in the overall sense of national intelligence such as the National Intelligence Estimate and the National Intelligence Survey, and the technical national intelligence such as, for example, that produced in the Scientific Estimates Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee.

The DD/I is also charged with furnishing several "services of common concern" described in appropriate National Security Council Intelligence Directives. It is presently believed that the overall responsibilities of the DD/I will be little affected by the transition from peacetime operations to a wartime footing. (Just as the DD/P is executive agent for the DCI for overseas activities of CIA, the DD/I is his executive agent for intelligence production.) To substantiate belief that the DD/I would have little change in mission in wartime, I should like to cite NSC 5521 in which the President's desire to continue to utilize the National Security Council to advise him on national security policies under emergency conditions is stated. Because the DCI will undoubtedly continue to be the intelligence advisor to the National Security Council, he has assumed that coordination of national intelligence will continue to be accomplished within the present structure of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

To study the impact of war on the operation of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Director recommended the convening of a

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working party, under the chairmanship of CIA. On 3 April 1956 the working party made its report to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Because the future planning and programming of DD/I activity for both wartime and peacetime operations will be based to a significant extent on the findings of the working group, it is desirable that you be made aware of the direction of the main national intelligence effort in wartime as contemplated by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

First of all, the Intelligence Advisory Committee will, of course, be responsive to specific requests from the National Security Council. Secondly, enemy potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities (excluding targeting), and intentions, all three to include scientific, technical, economic, political and certain broad military aspects, will be estimated at the national intelligence level. Thirdly, the probable courses of action of uncommitted countries under the pressure of a general war situation must be evaluated. Next, because it is well known that the policy level must be aware of the capabilities and requirements of allied and/or uncommitted economies as a basis for judging the changing support capabilities of these nations and their probable assistance requirements from United States logistic support, the working party believed that intensive study of economic intelligence at the national level will be required. Lastly, the unfortunate experiences following World War II in the economic and political spheres have been recognized to the extent that the Intelligence Advisory Committee believes that timely estimates of probable post-war economic and political situations in various parts of the world will be required immediately after the decisive phase of the war is reached.

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In order to accomplish these purposes, minor modifications of the present national intelligence mechanism will need to be made. As you are aware, we frequently are called upon to produce broad country estimates of the probable courses of action within a certain time period by a given country. Under wartime operation, however, there will be a greater number of special or "crash" estimates covering specific problems. The speed with which national intelligence will be produced in wartime will be much higher than under present circumstances. The large number of less comprehensive requirements, which we anticipate would be the order of the day in wartime, will bring about an automatic accommodation of the speed of production to urgency of requirement.

Global intelligence review at the national intelligence level will probably be produced on a periodic basis (monthly or perhaps, biweekly), in order to describe the overall global picture and to make general short-term projections for the use of policy-makers whose responsibilities may be found both in the national security field and residual governmental operations.

The National Intelligence Survey (NIS) program receives its primary direction from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but is administered as a "service of common concern" by the DD/I. There is now available in the published National Intelligence Survey a broad base of integrated basic intelligence in contrast to the serious deficiencies extending through most of World War II. Under peacetime conditions, the production of the National Intelligence Survey is continuing at the rate, and in accord with current priorities, established by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. This effort will provide in increasing measure the essential elements of basic intelligence required by the major high commands and planning staffs as well as the policy levels of government. Backstopping these published documents are the extensive files of detailed information maintained by the more than 40 governmental activities which contribute their skills to the National Intelligence Survey program.

In wartime, beyond the published National Intelligence Survey, there will be special basic intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater commanders and other top level operational and planning groups, which will call for a coordinated production effort best fulfilled through the already well established National Intelligence Survey mechanism. According to present plans, in wartime the National Intelligence Survey production effort will give priority to the filling of intelligence gaps and revision of surveys on areas of military importance; to the production of such National Intelligence Survey studies as may be required by the military or quasi-military situations; and to the development and integration of new basic intelligence requirements which may result from the impact of modern warfare. In the post-war period, the occupational personnel will have urgent need of basic intelligence support for military government operations. With the return of peace the National Intelligence Survey community must direct its attention to the formidable task of revising and bringing up to date large segments of the National Intelligence Survey to reflect the world-wide changes wrought by war.

So much for the national intelligence production work of the DD/I.

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Let me now say a word or two about the "services of common concern" to be performed by the DD/I under wartime circumstances.

Those of you who have been in Washington recently are well aware of the highly efficient central reference service which is now under development. The CIA Library and associated registers are now, or are about to perform a truly centralized reference service for the entire intelligence community. The demonstrated leadership in this field by the Office of Central Reference has now been accepted by all the Agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

In 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center (ASDIC) to be on a stand-by basis until war. The Chief of the Foreign Documents Division in the Office of Operations is the Assistant Director Designate of ASDIC, and a number of personnel from Foreign Documents Division are earmarked for transfer to ASDIC on D-day. The Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center will have as one of its Assistant Directors Designate, an officer of the Contact Division, Office of Operations. Of course the National Intelligence Survey program which I discussed in some detail above is technically a "service of common concern." In the field of current intelligence, we are planning to accept responsibility for the integration of all forms of current intelligence, i.e., military, scientific, economic, political and sociological, for presentation to the President and his senior advisors in the form of a White House Situation Room. This function will be a manifestation of the Director's responsibility to act as intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council.

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I should like to now turn to a few specific remarks concerning the production of scientific and economic intelligence in wartime. Modern science has discovered and developed numerous boons and banes of mankind. No single country or group of countries has a monopoly on the utilization of present scientific principles, or scientific principles yet to be discovered, for the conduct and support of war. It is, therefore, the mission of scientific intelligence to identify and evaluate the improvement in capability to conduct all-out war on the part of the enemy.

In wartime the scientific intelligence community must evaluate captured enemy material, both of the direct war-making type and of the support type, for technological breakthroughs which will make the war machine of the enemy more efficient than our own.

It is equally important to know the capabilities of our friends and allies to continue to contribute to the security of the international community opposed to the potential enemy. Economic intelligence has several discreet and yet interrelated functions in wartime. The fact that no individual any place in the world will be able to say that he is not on the front line in a future war provides us the reason why economic intelligence must contribute to strategic war planning designed to hit the enemy in his most vulnerable spot--the bread basket. If parts or all of the economies of presently friendly or neutral nations are overrun or immobilized by the enemy, economic intelligence must be available for the reallocation of the total resources of the nations allied with the United States for revised strategic planning. Economic intelligence must be produced on the

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net accretion to the enemy war-making capability by his absorption of the economic resources of conquered or occupied nations.

One of the really important jobs assigned to economic intelligence is that of the development of information upon which post-war planning can be based. As I mentioned earlier, our preparation during World War II in this important field was completely inadequate to cope with the situation as it existed immediately following the war. Such planning will be needed

- a. to prevent civilian disturbances interfering with military support operations in liberated and United States - occupied areas "in the wake of battle;"
- b. for setting up military government administrations; and
- c. for the eventual development of new political and economic institutions in former enemy countries.

Of course, this intelligence will be of direct and immediate importance to the Clandestine Services for planning political operations in the post-war period.

Up to now I have been discussing in general terms the responsibilities and plans of the DD/I for discharging his responsibility under a wartime circumstance. Let me now turn to a subject with which this group is most particularly interested, namely, the operation of the CIA overseas activity in wartime. The DD/I has stated that his present overseas functions will have no change in mission or scope except in response to requirements levied by the Clandestine Services or other competent authority. If, therefore, in the course of your

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planning for your own operations in a wartime context, you believe that the DI/I should provide you with any type of support either in intelligence production or backstopping, we should be grateful for such requirement as early as possible so that appropriate planning and programming may be effected.

I regret greatly that I am unable to make this presentation to you in person and to answer any questions that may be in your minds. I assure you that if you have any such questions and care to communicate them to me, I shall determine the answers and convey them to you with all possible dispatch.

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